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Realism Over Formalism and the Presumption of Constitutionality: 
Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion Upholding the Individual Mandate 
 
Wilson Huhn* 
 
Introduction  
 
 In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 Chief Justice John Roberts 
cast the deciding vote to uphold the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act.  Speaking 
for the Court in Part III-C of his opinion, Roberts found that the individual mandate was properly 
enacted pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.2  Two aspects of his opinion in particular drove 
this result.  In deciding whether the individual mandate constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of 
the Constitution, the Chief Justice engaged in realistic analysis rather than legal formalism.3  In 
addition, Roberts reasoned that, if fairly possible, the statute had to be construed in such a way as 
to render it constitutional.4  The confluence of realist analysis and the presumption of 
constitutionality resulted in a decision ruling that the Court should uphold the individual mandate 
as a proper exercise of Congress’s power to tax.5 
 
Part I of this essay discusses the significance of this ruling in light of its political, 
medical, and economic consequences.  Parts II and III contrast the formalist approach used by 
Justice Roberts in finding that the individual mandate was not a “tax” within the meaning of the 
Anti-Injunction Act with the functional approach he used in finding that the individual mandate 
is a tax for purposes of the General Welfare Clause.  Part IV describes how Justice Roberts 
deferred to Congress in considering the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  
 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CASE 
 
 On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of all but one provision 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).6  The Court issued its decision in a 
set of consolidated appeals under the title National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.  The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in this landmark case is the only opinion to even 
                                                 
*
  B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, 
University of Akron School of Law.  I wish to thank my research assistants, Jyme Mariani and Charles Ackman, for 
their dedicated and invaluable contributions to this article. 
1
 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2
 Id. at 2594-2601. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id.at 2600-02. 
5
 Id.at 2601. 
6
 See id. at 2608 (upholding the entirety of the Affordable Care Act except for a provision that would have allowed 
the federal government to withhold funding from the existing Medicaid program from any state that declined to 
enroll in the expanded Medicaid program).  
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partially command a majority of the justices.  Four justices joined Part II and Part III-C of 
Roberts’s opinion in finding that the federal Anti-Injunction Act did not apply7 and in upholding 
the constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” the requirement that all American citizens must 
have health insurance.8  Moreover, it appears that the rest of Roberts’s opinion constitutes the 
narrowest grounds for the Court’s decision upholding the expansion of Medicaid:9 ruling that the 
States are free to opt out of Medicaid expansion without losing existing funding10 and finding the 
remainder of the PPACA is “severable” from the single provision that was struck down.11  
Accordingly, even though the remainder of Roberts’s opinion is not joined by a majority of the 
justices, it may have precedential weight under Marks v. United States.12 
 
 The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case is of the utmost significance in a number of 
respects.  Politically, universal health care has long been the holy grail of progressives in 
America.13  The road toward universal health care had been slow but steady.  In 1965, Congress 
                                                 
7
 See id. at 2582-84 (finding that the individual mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction 
Act). 
8
 See id. at 2594-2600 (upholding the individual mandate as a “tax” within the meaning of the General Welfare 
Clause). 
9
 See id. at 2603 (upholding the expansion of the Medicaid program). 
10
 See id. at 2601-07 (striking down a provision of the Act that permitted the federal government to withhold 
existing Medicaid funding from a state that refused to expand its Medicaid program). 
11
 See id. at 2607-08 (finding the remainder of the Act to be severable from the unconstitutional provision). 
12
 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977) (in the case of a split majority, the narrowest reasoning 
of the Justice supplying the decisive vote should be considered the reasoning of the Court.). See also Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.) (finding that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact the individual mandate). In Part III-A of his opinion the Chief 
Justice ruled that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power to enact legislation under the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, a conclusion that the four dissenting justices also arrived at. It is not 
clear whether this portion of the opinion represents a holding of the Court or whether it is obiter dictum. Compare 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2600-01 (Roberts, C.J.) (contending that it was necessary to determine 
whether the individual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause in 
order for the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to apply to the analysis under the General Welfare Clause), with 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2629 fn. 12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating, 
“I see no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determinative.”). 
13
 See Zoe Clark, Congressman Dingell: “I know my father who started this fight is smiling from up above",  MICH. 
RADIO NEWS FOR MICH. (June 28, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://michiganradio.org/post/congressman-dingell-i-know-my-
father-who-started-fight-smiling-above; Julie Rovner, Rep. Dingell: The House's Link To Health-Care History, NPR 
(Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120159308. Rovner states: 
Dingell's quest for universal health care began in 1932, when his father, John Dingell Sr., 
was first elected to the House from Michigan. The elder Dingell quickly became one of the 
architects of the New Deal. 
… In 1943, the elder Dingell, along with Senators Jim Murray of Montana and Robert 
Wagner of New York, introduced the first national health insurance bill. The so-called Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bill was fought over for years, though it never became law.  
And when the elder Dingell died in 1955, John Dingell Jr. took over not only his father's 
seat, but also his quest for national health insurance. 
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enacted Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the indigent,14 and over the years it has 
continuously expanded both of those programs.15  Congress has also adopted several laws 
expanding protection for persons who have employer-provided health insurance, including 
ERISA (1974),16 COBRA (1985),17 and HIPAA (1996).18  But the premise of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act is that every American should have access to comprehensive, 
high-quality health care through the subsidized purchase of affordable health insurance.19  
Generations of Americans have struggled to extend adequate health care to the working class.20  
This law is a very substantial step towards the ultimate goal of universal health care.  
 
From the standpoint of public health, the United States ranks 37th in the world.21  
According to numerous studies, our nation trails nearly every other industrialized country in 
measures such as expected lifespan and infant mortality.22  One leading study states “[i]t is hard 
                                                 
14
 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 2863 (July 30, 1965). 
15
 See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 
(Dec. 8, 2003) (expanding Medicare coverage for prescription drugs). 
16
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (Sept. 2, 1974) (regulating 
the operation of employer health benefit plans). 
17
 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (Apr. 7, 1986) 
(entitling employees to purchase continuing health insurance coverage after termination of employment). 
18
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) 
(improving medical privacy and limiting restrictions that group health plans can place on coverage for preexisting 
conditions). 
19
 See Barack Obama, President Obama Signs Health Reform into Law, THE WHITE HOUSE (March 23, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-signs-health-reform-law#transcript (stating, 
“And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some 
basic security when it comes to their health care.”). 
20
 See id. President Obama stated: 
I’m signing this bill for all the leaders who took up this cause through the generations -- from 
Teddy Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt, from Harry Truman, to Lyndon Johnson, from Bill and 
Hillary Clinton, to one of the deans who’s been fighting this so long, John Dingell.  (Applause.)  
To Senator Ted Kennedy.  (Applause.)  And it’s fitting that Ted’s widow, Vicki, is here -- it’s 
fitting that Teddy’s widow, Vicki, is here; and his niece Caroline; his son Patrick, whose vote 
helped make this reform a reality.  (Applause.). 
See also note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
21
 See World Health Org., World Health Report 2000, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at 
http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
22
 See Org. for Econ. & Coop. Dev., Health Status, OECD.STAT EXTRACTS, 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT. (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (showing lower life 
expectancy and higher infant mortality for Americans compared to the people of other industrialized countries); 
Ellen Nolte & Martin McKee, Variations in Amenable Mortality—Trends in 16 High-Income Nations, 103 HEALTH 
POL’Y 47, 47-52 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-
Literature/2011/Sep/Variations-in-Amenable-Mortality.aspx (showing that America had the highest rate of 
“amendable mortality” that is, deaths that could have been prevented with appropriate health care); The 
Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the U.S. Health Care System Compares 
Internationally, 2010 Update, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2010/Jun/Mirror-Mirror-
Update.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Mirror, Mirror 2010]. 
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to ignore that in 2006, the United States was number 1 in terms of health care spending per 
capita but ranked 39th for infant mortality, 43rd for adult female mortality, 42nd for adult male 
mortality, and 36th for life expectancy.”23 
 
The PPACA holds out the promise of alleviating the suffering of tens of millions of Americans.24 
 
In addition, for better or for worse, this massive piece of legislation will also have dramatic 
economic consequences for the United States.  The health care industry constitutes one-sixth – 
soon to be one-fifth – of the American economy.25  It represents the largest component of 
government spending and is the principal driver of government budget deficits.26  Over sixty 
percent of bankruptcies in the United States are caused in substantial part by health care costs.27 
Because the cost of health insurance has risen far faster than income,28 there has opened a 
                                                 
23
 Christopher J.L. Murray & Julio Frenk, Ranking 37th — Measuring the Performance of the U.S. Health Care 
System, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2010 98, 98-99 (January 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0910064#t=article.  
24
 See Cathy Schoen, Michelle M. Doty, Ruth H. Robertson & Sara R. Collins, Affordable Care Act Reforms Could 
Reduce the Number of Underinsured U.S. Adults by 70 Percent, 30(9) HEALTH AFF. 1762, 1762-71 (Sept. 2011), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-Literature/2011/Sep/Reduce-Uninsured.aspx 
[hereinafter Reduce Underinsured].  
25
 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (Mar. 
23, 2010) (stating, “Health insurance and health care services are a significant part of the national economy. 
National health spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 
to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI, 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION 
LEGISLATION COMBINED WITH H.R. 3590 AS PASSED BY THE SENATE (MARCH 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf  (showing health care spending is expected to grow to over 
20% of American economy by 2020).  
26
 See Christopher Chantrill, US Health Spending, GOV’T SPENDING IN AM., 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_health_care_spending_10.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (showing 
health care expenditures as the largest single expenditure in federal spending); Andrew J. Rettenmeier, Health Care 
Spending Forecasts, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (April 23, 2009), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba654. 
Rettenmeier states: 
Given that 45 percent of health care spending is currently funded by government payers, future 
budget implications are staggering. For example, in addition to dedicated payroll taxes and 
premium payments, federal spending on Medicare will:  
• Require funding equal to 36 percent of federal income taxes by 2030, based on the CMS 
forecast; and 
• Require funding equal to almost 70 percent of federal income taxes by midcentury, based 
on the CBO forecast.  
27
 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1501(a)(2)(E) (stating, “Half of all personal bankruptcies are 
caused in part by medical expenses.”); David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffi 
Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122(8) AM. J. MED. 741, 
741-46 (2009), available at http://www.pnhp.org/new_bankruptcy_study/Bankruptcy-2009.pdf (stating, “62.1% of 
all bankruptcies in 2007 were medical; 92% of these medical debtors had medical debts over $5000, or 10% of 
pretax family income.”). 
28
 See Kaiser Fam. Found., Employer Health Benefits 2012 Annual Survey, (Slides 59, 4) available at 
http://ehbs.kff.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Annual Survey]. 
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yawning gap between high-income and low-income Americans in their access to health care.29  
The United States spends twice as much per capita on health care as other countries but the 
members of its workforce have shorter lives and are less healthy while they are alive.30 
  
These problems have to be resolved or the United States will cease to be economically 
competitive with other nations. 
 
 In spite of the serious – even grave – medical and economic challenges that the PPACA 
was designed to address, the constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” a key provision of the 
Affordable Care Act, was challenged, not on realistic grounds, but for semantic and formalistic 
reasons.  In his interpretation of the General Welfare Clause, Chief Justice Roberts rejected these 
formalistic approaches to constitutional interpretation.  He upheld the individual mandate 
because he chose to focus on the law’s actual operation, not the label that Congress attached to 
it.  His analysis made constitutionality turn upon the actual effect of the law, not the category 
that it might be relegated to. 
 
 Furthermore, in his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly acknowledged the limited 
role that the courts must play in determining the constitutionality of laws like this.31  In cases 
affecting the constitutional rights of individuals or relatively powerless minority groups, the 
courts must play a vital role.32  In such cases, the courts must stand between the government and 
its citizens, and carefully scrutinize laws that threaten our individual rights or unfairly 
discriminate against classes of persons.33  But economic legislation is presumed constitutional 
because the adoption of economic policy is a legislative and not a judicial function.34  The 
purpose of economic policy is to adjust and compromise the interests of various groups in 
society, and the courts are institutionally incapable of making such adjustments and 
                                                 
29
 See Sara Collins, Michelle Doty, Ruth Robertson & Tracy Garber, Help on the Horizon: How the Recession Has 
Left Millions of Workers Without Health Insurance, and How Health Reform Will Bring Relief - Findings from The 
Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance Survey of 2010, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (March 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2011/Mar/Help-on-the-
Horizon.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Help on the Horizon]. 
30
 See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text. See also Mark Pearson, Written Statement to Special Senate 
Commission on Aging: Disparities in health expenditure across OECD countries:  Why does the United States spend 
so much more than other countries?, ORG. FOR ECON. & COOP. DEV. (September 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf. 
31
 See notes 88-104 infra and accompanying text. 
32
 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (announcing that, while the 
constitutionality of economic legislation is to be evaluated under the rational basis test, laws affecting political 
rights, infringing the protections of the Bill of Rights, or invading the rights of “discrete and insular” minority 
groups, would “be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”). 
33
 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-07 (1965) (invoking “strict scrutiny” in striking down a 
state statute making it illegal to use birth control); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-71 (1966) 
(invoking strict scrutiny in striking down state poll tax); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (employing 
“intermediate scrutiny” in declaring that it was unconstitutional for a public university to refuse to admit women). 
34
 See, e.g., Carolene Products, 304 U.S., at 152 (stating, “[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
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compromises.35  The decision of the Supreme Court in this case reflects the fundamental 
principle that the courts are prohibited from resolving questions of economic policy.  Instead, 
these questions represent political judgments that are committed to the legislative process. 
 
I. THE INTRODUCTION TO CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’ OPINION 
 
The introductory portion of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion is written for a general 
audience.  This portion of Roberts’ opinion is joined by no other justice, and does not directly 
address the issue before the Court: the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.36  However, 
Roberts’ introductory remarks may well be remembered long after the nation has ceased to 
discuss the constitutionality of universal health care legislation. 
 
This portion of Roberts’ opinion is a primer on the structural principles of the United 
States Constitution – the concepts of federalism, enumeration of powers, and separation of 
powers.37  It is clear, concise, and convincing. It deals with the fundamental principles of 
American Constitutional Law, yet it is written in such a simple, straightforward style that it could 
be included in a textbook for elementary school students.  Chief Justice Roberts’ language is not 
poetic or uplifting.  He lacks the eloquence of Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, or Robert 
Jackson.  But while he may not inspire, he does inform.  
 
Furthermore, in the introduction Roberts foreshadows his ruling upholding the 
Affordable Care Act.38  Notice how the following passage references not only the constitutional 
limits on the power of Congress but also the limits on the power of the courts: 
 
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only 
limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.  
Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that 
“the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” 
to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will 
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.”  
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).  
In this case we must again determine whether the Constitution 
grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and 
individuals believe it does not possess.  Resolving this controversy 
requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s power, 
and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.39 
 
                                                 
35
 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (stating, “The conflicts of economic interest between the 
regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its 
more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination.”).  
36
 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577-80 (2012). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 2577. 
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In the course of the introduction, Chief Justice Roberts discusses the handful of 
enumerated powers of Congress that are relevant to this case.40  In addition to Congress’s power 
to regulate economic activity under the Commerce Clause41 and its power to enact 
supplementary legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause,42 Roberts offered this pithy 
explanation of Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause – commonly known as the 
“power of the purse:”  “Put simply, Congress may tax and spend.  This grant gives the Federal 
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate.  The Federal 
Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise 
control.”43 
 
Near the close of his introductory remarks, Chief Justice Roberts describes the limited 
role that the courts must play in ruling on the constitutionality of laws such as the Affordable 
Care Act.44  Roberts observes that questions of policy are to be determined by the political 
branches in accordance with the political choices of the citizenry: 
 
Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the 
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make 
policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s 
elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people 
disagree with them.  It is not our job to protect the people from the 
consequences of their political choices.45 
 
 Roberts’s deference to Congress in this case was enough to tip the scales in favor of the 
law.  
 
 The following portions of this article describe the contrasting approaches that Justice 
Roberts followed and the contradictory results he reached in deciding whether the individual 
mandate is a “tax” for statutory and constitutional purposes.  
 
II. ROBERTS’ TEXTUAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-
INJUNCTION ACT 
 
 In Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the federal Anti-Injunction Act 
does not bar the courts from hearing this case.46  The four concurring justices joined this portion 
of his opinion,47 and the four dissenting justices came to the same conclusion.48  In this portion 
                                                 
40
 Id. at 2577-80. 
41
 See id. at 2578-79. 
42
 See id. at 2579. 
43
 Id.  
44
 See id. at 2579-80. 
45
 Id. at 2579. 
46
 See id. at 2582-84. 
47
 See id. at 2609. 
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of his opinion Chief Justice Roberts avoids policy analysis and instead looks to the text of the 
statute and the intent of Congress to determine the meaning of the law.49 
 
The federal Anti-Injunction Act50 prohibits the courts from hearing lawsuits challenging 
tax laws until the taxes are paid.  If the Anti-Injunction Act had applied to this case, the plaintiffs 
could not have filed suit until 2014 when the penalty for failing to have health insurance goes 
into effect.51  Both sides in this dispute wanted the courts to determine the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act before 2014.52  Because both plaintiffs and defendants took the position that 
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply, the Supreme Court appointed amicus counsel to formulate 
the strongest arguments in support of the proposition that the Act does apply and that the courts 
are prohibited from considering challenges to the Act at this time.53 
 
 In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret both the 
Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.  Chief Justice Roberts first addressed the 
textual argument made by amicus counsel: 
 
Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the 
penalty as a tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this 
suit.  
 
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise.  The 
Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits “for the purpose of restraining 
the assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a) (emphasis 
added).  Congress, however, chose to describe the “[s]hared 
responsibility payment” imposed on those who forgo health 
insurance not as a “tax,” but as a “penalty.”  §§5000A(b), 
(g)(2).  There is no immediate reason to think that a statute 
applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.” 
 
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” 
rather than a “tax” is significant because the Affordable Care 
Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.”54  
(emphasis added) 
 
Justice Roberts pointed out that the language of the Internal Revenue Code acknowledges 
the distinction between a tax and a penalty: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
48
 See id. at 2655-56. 
49
 See id. at 2582-84. 
50
 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a) (West 2006). 
51
 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2582. 
52
 See id. 
53
 See id. 
54
 Id. at 2582-83. 
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In light of the Code's consistent distinction between the terms 
“tax” and “assessable penalty,” we must accept the Government's 
interpretation: § 6201(a) instructs the Secretary that his authority to 
assess taxes includes the authority to assess penalties, but it does 
not equate assessable penalties to taxes for other purposes.55 
 
The court-appointed amicus attorney urged the Court to adopt a “functional” definition of 
whether the individual mandate constitutes a tax: “Amicus argues that even though Congress did 
not label the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti–
Injunction Act because it functions like a tax.”56 
 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected this “functional approach” to interpreting the meaning of 
the Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.57  Instead, Roberts looked to more standard 
forms of statutory construction: legislative intent and the text of the statute.58  Statutes are the 
voice of the people governing themselves, and, in the interpretation of statutes, the courts must 
respect the intent of people’s elected representatives.59  In attempting to discern Congress’s 
intent in the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, Justice 
Roberts looked primarily to the statutory text, calling it the “best evidence of Congress’s intent”: 
“The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s 
own creation.  How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of 
Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”60  (emphasis added) 
 
Accordingly, in Part II of his opinion, Justice Roberts utilized a textual approach to 
statutory interpretation in ruling that the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act is not a 
tax within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act.61  However, in Part III-C of his opinion, the 
Chief Justice ruled that the individual mandate is a tax within the meaning of the General 
Welfare Clause!62  In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Roberts adopted a completely different 
interpretive approach.  In place of a formalistic approach that focused on the words of the statute 
or the intent of Congress, Justice Roberts looked to how the law functions – the operation and 
effect of the law. 
 
                                                 
55
 Id. at 2584. 
56
 Id. at 2583. 
57
 Id. at 2583-84. 
58
 Id. 
59
 See, e.g., Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 28-29 (7th ed. 
2007). The authors state: 
An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues are written in the 
context of legislative intent. The reason for this lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe 
statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the 
government is mandated by principles of separation of powers.  
60
 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2583. 
61
 Id. at 2583-84. 
62
 Id. at 2600. 
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III – ROBERTS’ “FUNCTIONAL APPROACH” TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE 
 
As noted above, in Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the individual 
mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning of the federal Anti-Injunction Act.63  However, in Part 
III-C of his opinion, Roberts found that the individual mandate is a “tax” within the meaning of 
the General Welfare Clause.64  How did he arrive at this seemingly contradictory result? 
 
This very point was raised at oral argument by Justice Samuel Alito in his questioning of 
Solicitor General Robert Verrilli: 
 
JUSTICE ALITO: General Verrilli, today you are arguing that the penalty is not a 
tax [under the Anti-Injunction Act].  Tomorrow you are going to be back and you 
be arguing that the penalty is a tax [under the General Welfare Clause].  Has the 
Court ever held that something that is a tax for purposes of the taxing power 
under the Constitution is not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act?65 
 
General Verrilli’s response to Justice Alito may not be in the hard-hitting style that 
appeals to emotion and excites partisans,66 but it is honest, nuanced, and elegant.  Verrilli 
conceded that the Court had never ruled that a law could be a tax for purposes of the General 
Welfare Clause and not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, however, he distinguished 
questions of statutory interpretation from questions of constitutional interpretation: 
 
GENERAL VERRILLI: No, Justice Alito, but the Court has held in a (sic) license 
tax cases that something can be a constitutional exercise of the taxing power 
whether or not it is called a tax.  And that's because the nature of the inquiry that 
we will conduct tomorrow is different from the nature of the inquiry that we will 
conduct today.  Tomorrow the question is whether Congress has the authority 
under the taxing power to enact it and the form of words doesn't have a 
dispositive effect on that analysis.  Today we are construing statutory text where 
the precise choice of words does have a dispositive effect on the analysis.67 
 
 In deciding whether the Anti-Injunction Act applied to this case, Justice Roberts observed 
that this was a matter that was committed solely to Congress.68  The Court had to determine 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 2583-84. 
64
 Id. at 2600. 
65
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) 2012 WL 
993811, at *1. 
66
 See John M. Broder, Vindication for Maligned Lawyer in Yesterday’s Decision, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/in-health-ruling-vindication-for-donald-verrilli.html (stating that after oral 
argument “legal commentators heaped scorn on [Verrilli], declaring his performance a ‘train wreck’ and a 
‘flameout,’ and he was lampooned by Jon Stewart”). 
67
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-
398), 2012 WL 993811, at *1. 
68
 See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
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whether Congress intended to postpone judicial review of the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act until 2014.  It was a matter of congressional intent, and in resolving this 
question, the Court was necessarily bound by the words of the relevant statutes.69  On the other 
hand, whether the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to enact the 
Affordable Care Act is ultimately not a question of statutory construction but rather a matter of 
constitutional interpretation.  The General Welfare Clause states: “The Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ….”70 
 
This provision of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes.”71 
The constitutionality of the individual mandate depends upon whether it is or is not a tax, and 
that determination is not up to Congress.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, if Congress were to 
enact a law without indicating whether it was a tax, the courts would obviously have to 
determine whether it was a tax in determining whether it was a proper enactment under the 
General Welfare Clause.72  Roberts offered the following example: 
 
An example may help illustrate why labels should not control here.  
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every taxpayer 
who owns a house without energy efficient windows must pay $50 
to the IRS.  The amount due is adjusted based on factors such as 
taxable income and joint filing status, and is paid along with the 
taxpayer’s income tax return.  Those whose income is below the 
filing threshold need not pay.  The required payment is not called a 
“tax,” a “penalty,” or anything else.  No one would doubt that this 
law imposed a tax, and was within Congress’s power to tax.73  
 
Roberts then noted that such a law would be a “tax” for constitutional purposes even if 
Congress called it a “penalty.”74  Earlier in his opinion, Roberts had observed “Congress cannot 
change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing 
it as one or the other.”75  
 
In Part II of his opinion, dealing with statutory construction of the Affordable Care Act 
and the Anti-Injunction Act, Justice Roberts had emphasized the importance of the “label” that 
Congress attached to the law: 
 
                                                 
69
 See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
70
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
71
 Id. 
72
 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2597-98. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id.at 2598 (stating, “That conclusion should not change simply because Congress used the word “penalty” to 
describe the payment.”). 
75
 Id. at 2583. 
12 
 
Congress's decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a 
“tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes 
many other exactions it creates as “taxes.”  Where Congress uses 
certain language in one part of a statute and different language in 
another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.76 
 
However, in Part III of his opinion, dealing with the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate, Justice Roberts repeatedly and emphatically rejected the contention of the dissent that 
the question could be determined solely by reference to the “label” that Congress attached to this 
enactment.  Roberts stated: 
 
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a 
“penalty,” not a “tax.”  But while that label is fatal to the 
application of the Anti–Injunction Act, it does not determine 
whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's 
taxing power.  It is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti–
Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be 
guided by Congress's choice of label on that question.  That choice 
does not, however, control whether an exaction is within 
Congress's constitutional power to tax.77 
 
The Chief Justice’s “functional approach” consisted of three separate arguments.  First, 
he listed several ways in which the individual mandate “looks like a tax:”78 
 
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without 
health insurance looks like a tax in many respects.  The “[s]hared 
responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is paid into the 
Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns.  It does 
not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes 
because their household income is less than the filing threshold in 
the Internal Revenue Code.  For taxpayers who do owe the 
payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as 
taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status.  The 
requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and 
enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously explained—must 
assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.”  This process 
yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some 
revenue for the Government.  Indeed, the payment is expected to 
raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.79 
 
                                                 
76
 Id. (citation omitted). 
77
 Id. at 2594 (internal citation omitted). 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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In the second passage, Justice Roberts identified three factors that distinguish a “tax” 
from a “penalty,” and found that the individual mandate satisfied all three elements.80  A “tax,” 
reasoned Justice Roberts, is in an amount that is not so large as to utterly discourage the activity 
altogether; it is collected by the taxing authorities; and it is imposed on a strict liability basis 
regardless of the taxpayer’s state of mind or level of culpability.81  
 
The individual mandate meets all three of these elements: the amount that is due is far 
less than the cost of health insurance,82 the amount is collected by the Internal Revenue 
Service,83 and the amount is owed if the taxpayer does not have health insurance, regardless of 
whether this omission was intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent, or without any fault of the 
taxpayer.84  
 
In the third passage that betokened a “functional approach” Justice Roberts concluded 
that the individual mandate is not a “penalty” because under the Affordable Care Act people who 
decline to obtain health insurance are not considered “outlaws.”85  Instead, the Affordable Care 
Act gives people the choice of either obtaining health insurance or paying the amount 
specified.86  This means that the individual mandate was a tax on certain conduct rather than a 
penalty for violating the law.87 
 
Another factor that determined the result in this case is that the Chief Justice gave the 
statute the benefit of the doubt.  Roberts’ deference to Congress is the subject of the next portion 
of this essay. 
 
IV. ROBERTS’ DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS IN DETERMINING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
 
One of the most significant factors that drove the Court to acknowledge the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act is the deference that the Court showed to Congress. 
Chief Justice Roberts invoked two principles that contributed to this deference: the canon of 
                                                 
80
 See id. at 2595-96. 
81
 See id. at 2595. 
82
 See id. at 2595-96. 
83
 See id. at 2596. 
84
 See id. 
85
 Id. at 2596-97. Justice Roberts stated: 
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather than 
buy insurance. See Congressional Budget Office, supra, at 71. We would expect Congress to be 
troubled by that prospect if such conduct were unlawful. That Congress apparently regards such 
extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it 
was creating four million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment 
merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance. 
86
 See id. 
87
 See id.at 2596-2600. 
14 
 
constitutional avoidance and the principle that questions of policy are for Congress and not the 
courts to determine. 
 
American courts have the power of “judicial review” – the authority to declare statutes 
unconstitutional.88  But the principle of Separation of Powers cautions respect for the people’s 
political choices and places a brake on the power of judicial review.  One doctrine that was relied 
upon in this case was the interpretive canon of “constitutional avoidance.”  This is the guideline 
that instructs the courts to, if possible, construe a statute in such a way as to render it 
constitutional.  As Chief Justice Roberts said, “[I]t is well established that if a statute has two 
possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that 
does not do so.”89  Roberts quoted well-known passages by Justices Joseph Story and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in support of this proposition.90  
 
In this case, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance enabled the Court to uphold the 
individual mandate as a tax.  Roberts explained that even though this might not be “the most 
natural interpretation of the mandate,” nevertheless the Court had the duty to ask whether it was 
“fairly possible” to construe that requirement to be a tax:  
 
[I]f the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers 
who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress's 
constitutional power to tax.  The question is not whether that is the 
most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a 
“fairly possible” one.  As we have explained, “every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.”  The Government asks us to interpret the 
mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the 
Constitution.91  
 
Roberts added, “[g]ranting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, 
it can be so read….”92 
 
                                                 
88
 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-79 (1803) (declaring the power of the courts to strike down laws that 
are unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2579-80 (acknowledging the same). 
89
 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2593. 
90
 Id. Roberts stated: 
Justice Story said that 180 years ago: “No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered 
it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation, however 
unintentional, of the constitution.” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–449, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830). 
Justice Holmes made the same point a century later: “[T]he rule is settled that as between two 
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other 
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 
148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
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 Id. at 2594 (citations omitted). 
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 Id. 
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Roberts’s invocation of “constitutional avoidance” to preserve the individual mandate of 
the Affordable Care Act is at all not surprising.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
frequently construed statutes so as to preserve their constitutionality.93  For example, in 2009 in 
Northwest Austin Utility District No. One v. Holder,94 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts, narrowly construed a provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act in order to avoid striking 
it down as unconstitutional.95  In his opinion for the Court in Northwest Austin, Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance arises from the respect that is due 
Congress as a coequal branch: 
 
We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of an Act of 
Congress is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is 
called on to perform.”  “The Congress is a coequal branch of 
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold 
the Constitution of the United States.”96 
 
 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is not the only interpretive principle that 
restrained the Court’s power of judicial review in this case.  Of equal or greater importance is the 
principle that the courts must defer to Congress on matters of economic policy, and the 
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act represents a fundamental decision affecting 
national economic policy.  The ACA seeks to regulate myriad aspects of the health care industry, 
which constitutes one-sixth of the American economy.97  Nor was this policy choice lightly 
taken.  Congress and the American people have struggled with the problem of expanding access 
to health care for generations and spent more than a year debating the contours of the ACA.98 
Nor was the policy choice simple and straightforward.  The ACA contains hundreds of 
provisions, representing myriad and complex compromises, balancing the interests of consumers, 
providers, employers and insurers.99  This law is fraught with vast consequences (for good or ill) 
for the American people.  
 
Over a century ago, in his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,100 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes eloquently expressed the principle that economic policy is to be determined by 
the people acting through the legislative branch, not by the courts in the interpretation of the 
Constitution: 
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 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2929-30 (2010) (narrowly construing a federal criminal fraud 
statute to preserve its constitutionality against a vagueness challenge).  
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 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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 See id. at 206-11. 
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employers—while, at the same time, offsetting significant portions of those costs with new benefits to each group.”). 
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[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the 
citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of 
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding 
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, 
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether 
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States.101 
 
After 1937, the Supreme Court embraced Holmes’s understanding of the Constitution and 
it has reiterated this principle innumerable times.102  At several points in his opinion, Justice 
Roberts acknowledged that questions of policy are left to Congress, not to the courts. In the 
introduction to his opinion Roberts stated:  
 
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a 
general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation's elected 
leaders.  “Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the 
government” requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only 
if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question 
is clearly demonstrated.”  Members of this Court are vested with 
the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise 
nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.  Those decisions are 
entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of 
office if the people disagree with them.  It is not our job to protect 
the people from the consequences of their political choices.103 
 
Deferring to Congress, Justice Roberts concluded that the individual mandate could 
reasonably be construed as a tax, and that it was constitutional.104 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Chief Justice John Roberts upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act 
because he rejected formalism and embraced realism in constitutional analysis, and because he 
deferred to Congress, acknowledging its right to make policy choices. 
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 Id. at 2608 (stating, “In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as increasing 
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There are several other significant aspects of Justice Roberts’ ruling upholding the 
individual mandate.  For instance, Justice Roberts reaffirmed the principle that Congress has the 
power to impose “regulatory taxes” under the General Welfare Clause,105 and he contended that 
the power to tax is narrower than the power to regulate106 – but those points will have to be 
addressed in another article. 
                                                 
105
 See id. at 2596 (stating, “Indeed, “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an 
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.” Sonzinsky, supra, at 513, 57 S.Ct. 
554. That [the individual mandate] seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean 
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